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CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY: MOTOR
CARRIER LICENSING BY THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION
GEORGE M. CHANDwLER*
The author discusses the historic development of motor carrier
licensing in terms of public policy considerations and how the ICC
has interpreted statutory exemptions to promote a reasonable regu-
latory scheme. The author also considers the current procedure and
substantive requirements for application proceedings.
A major factor in the federal regulation of motor transportation is
control of entry, which was added to the ICC's jurisdiction in 1935.'
The licensing of new or enlarged motor-carrier operations has come
to represent by far the largest single group of formal proceedings
with which the Commission must deal.2 In the course of more than
thirty years of granting certificates and permits to motor common
and contract carriers,3 standards have been formalized which are
applied in determining whether a new operation should be authorized.'
* Chairman, Operating Rights Review Board Number 2, Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, Washington, D.C. The views expressed are those of the author and should not
be taken as reflecting the position of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
1 Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1964). The act is now Part II of
the Interstate Commerce Act.
2 In fiscal year 1966 (the year ending June 30, 1966) 8,886 formal proceedings were
closed, of which 6,767, or about 74 percent, were motor carrier applications. The Com-
mission's total caseload, including informal proceedings not normally subject to hearing
procedures, amounted to 15,851 during this period. 80 ICC Ann. Rep. 110-112 (1966).
3 Common carriers, who serve the public at large, receive "certificates" upon a find-
ing that their services are required by the public convenience and necessity; contract car-
riers, who serve one or a limited number of persons, receive "permits" upon a finding that
their services would be consistent with the public interest and the national transportation
policy. 49 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) (14), (15), 307, 309 (1964).
4 The discussion here will be directed primarily to the standards applicable to com-
mon carriers. Contract carriers are governed by their own statutory criteria enacted in
1957. 49 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1964), discussed in ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81
(1961).
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At the same time procedures have been worked out, tried, and
changed in attempting to meet the dictates of necessity and to cope
with the ever-increasing flood of quasi-judicial application proceedings
on as current a basis as possible. What follows is an attempt to brighten
some of the darker corners of this highly specialized area of administra-
tive law, and also to shed some light on the problems facing the ad-
ministrative agency which must try to keep up with the fast-growing
and ever-changing commercial scene.
I. ORIGINs OF FEDERAL MOTOR CARRiER LICENSING
On March 2, 1925, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Buck v. Kuykendal5 holding that the States may not restrict the
operations of motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce unless
their regulation is primarily with a view toward insuring safety or the
conservation of highways. For nearly ten years afterward there was
no economic regulation of interstate motor carriage,' but the forces
which would shape the federal regulatory scheme were already active.
A year after Buck v. Kuykendall the ICC instituted an investigation
into the possibilities of regulating interstate motor transportation. Its
conclusion was that while regulation was probably in the public inter-
est, the primary responsibility should be turned over to the States, so
long as they were willing to act.r However, the basic rationale behind
entry control had already been formulated. After pointing out that a
majority of the States license new motor-carrier operations only after
finding that they are required by the public convenience and necessity,
the Commission said:
Certificates of public convenience and necessity are required
not so much with a view to safety or to the conservation of the high-
ways but primarily for the purpose of protecting the public interest
by excluding unnecessary and wasteful competition and by deter-
mining what~persons or companies are best able to serve the public.
The requirement that a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity shall be a pre-requisite to motor-vehicle operation prevents
duplication and unnecessary service where existing facilities are
sufficient to meet the transportation needs of the public; it protects
the public by preventing irresponsible operations; and gives to
certificated carriers some protection against unnecessary compe-
tition.8
5 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
6 Terminal area pickup or delivery service performed by or for a railroad was
regulated by the ICC as part of the rail movement, but line-haul motor service, even if
performed by a railroad, was not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Coordination
of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 367 (1932); Constructive and Off-Track R.R.
Freight Stations, 156 I.C.C. 205, 235 (1929).
7 Motor Bus and Motor Truck Operation, 140 I.C.C. 685, 746 (1928).
8 Id. at 737-38.
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Prevention of wasteful duplication of services, protection of the public,
and protection of investment in carrier facilities were the recurring
themes in attempts to persuade Congress to embark upon federal motor
carrier regulation. They have continued to be significant factors in
determining whether to approve a proposed motor service.
A second major study of the motor carrier situation conducted by
the Commission culminated with the issuance of a lengthy report in
Coordination of Motor Transportation9 in 1932. The Commission then
recommended that interstate motor transportation be made subject to
full economic regulation on the federal level. By this time, the trucking
business, like all others, was suffering from the effects of depression.
One of the measures taken to meet the crisis facing the transportation
system was the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933,1"
which created the office of Federal Coordinator of Transportation. His
duty was to make a study of means for "improving conditions surround-
ing transportation in all its forms and the preparation of plans there-
for."" ICC Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman was named coordinator,
and his report, a large part of which was devoted to the proposal to
regulate interstate motor carriers, was submitted to the Senate on
March 10, 1934.12 The draft bill included in the Coordinator's report
formed the basis of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, containing the basic
rate and entry control provisions still in effect.
Behind the inclusion of a licensing requirement in the federal
regulatory scheme was the fact that virtually all other attempts to
regulate motor transportation by the States and foreign countries in-
cluded such provisions." The consensus was that State control of entry
had worked well and was necessary for a successful overall sytem of
regulation. Commissioner Eastman, in the Second Coordinator's report,
noted that intrastate regulation had generally been successful, and had
resulted in stabilization of operations and improvement in facilities
and service. 4
While the first urgings for motor carrier regulation on a national
9 182 I.C.C. 263 (1932).
10 Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933, ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211 (1933).
11 Id. § 4.
12 Regulation of Transportation Agencies, Second Report of the Federal Coordinator
of Transportation, S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Second Coordinator's report]. An account of the report's preparation and of the early
days of ICC motor carrier regulation will be found in the comments of Charles S.
Morgan in Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., An Evaluation of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Enactment 4-18 (Comm.
Print 1965).
13 Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 371-72; Second Coordina-
tor's report 21, 31, 177; 79 Cong. Rec. 5653 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wheeler).
14 Second Corridinator's report 192.
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scale came from their major competitors, the railroads, by 1935 many
responsible spokesmen of the bus and truck industry supported a statu-
tory system of government controls. Those favoring such a system,
which would put limitations on entry, included what is now the Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, Inc. and the National Highway Users Con-
ference, which had representatives from both shippers and carriers.15
The prevailing thinking regarding the need for certificate and permit
requirements in the Motor Carrier Act was ably summed up by Com-
missioner Eastman in the Second Coordinator's report:
It is believed that the experience of the past, not only with the
railroads but with all industry, and not only in this country but in
other parts of the world, shows which course to take. We relied in
the early days of railroading upon free competition as the means of
public protection, and the result was bankrupt and unsafe railroads,
bad labor conditions, flagrant favoritism in rates with the benefit
going to the big shipper and the big community, and an uncertainty
and instability which were demoralizing to industry in general. Com-
petition was not universal, for the railroads enjoyed a monopoly at
many of the smaller places. But public regulation was imposed quite
as much to cure the ills of unrestrained competition as to curb the
exactions of monopoly. Of late the country has begun to discover
that competition can also require restraint in industries which were
not supposed to be affected, like transportation, with the public
interest.16
II. ENTRY CONTROL TODAY
The Doyle report17 summed up the need for entry controls in
transportation by saying: "[T] here appears to be no chance of unregu-
lated competition operating in the national interest until the Golden
Rule becomes the universally accepted law of business relations." The
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was born out of depression and was designed
to regulate an industry that was only beginning to develop and would
today be hardly recognizable. But trucking men and their clientele
have not undergone such a change in the past thirty years. The profit
motive will still lead the carrier to pursue the more lucrative traffic
to the disadvantage of consignors and consignees of less profitable
freight, and particularly to the detriment of the small-volume shipper.18
15 Id. at 25-26; H.R. 1645 to accompany S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
16 Second Coordinator's report 96.
17 National Transportation Policy: Report prepared for the Senate Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as Doyle
report], by a special study group on transportation policies headed by Maj. Gen. John P.
Doyle.
18 See 80 ICC Ann. Rep. 19-22 (1966). The perennial "small-shipment problem" is
one of the major issues facing the Commission at the present time.
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No alternative to controlled competition and the attendant ability of
the government to enforce the service obligations of common carriers
has been suggested as a means for assuring that adequate transportation
is available to all.
Fundamental to any discussion of government control or regula-
tion is the principle that a common carrier is by nature a public utility.
He renders a vital service which cannot be provided individually by
each person having a need for it. Private carriage is for many a prac-
tical alternative, which means that the motor carrier is not quite in
the same class as utilities engaged in less easily duplicated services such
as providing electricity, gas, or water. But a proprietary truck opera-
tion is not a practical alternative for a small shipper or one whose
traffic moves predominantly in one direction; these are precisely the
types of shippers whose traffic will be least attractive to the for-hire
carrier and who will have the most trouble obtaining transportation
service in the absence of industry controls and government compul-
sion. Examples of the disinclination of motor common carriers to pro-
vide service are found in recent complaints before the Commission in
which entire communities (St. Joseph, Mo., and Garden City, Kans.,
in these instances) stood to lose a substantial part of their available
motor transportation.19 After conducting formal investigations into
these complaints, the Commission ordered motor common carriers to
resume reasonably adequate and continuous service as required by
their certificates.
One aspect of business regulation is that it purports to provide
protection, or at least to offer benefits, not only to the public patronizing
the regulated activity, but to that activity itself. Prevention of unre-
strained competition in the motor carrier industry obviously leads to
a kind of controlled monopoly and ultimately to more business, and
presumably more profits, for the franchised carriers. The large-volume
shipper needs little of -the protection which economic regulation of
transportation provides, and to a very great extent the same is true of
the major motor carriers. But the small shipper may need all the help
he can get, whether he realizes it or not. It is likely to be only the fear
of losing a valuable operating right which will bring the large and
profitable motor carrier to accept unprofitable or marginally profitable
freight.
The other direction in which the small shipper can turn for service
is to the equally-small motor carrier, willing to handle his traffic at a
modest profit but able to maintain service only if assured of a steady
19 Pacific Intermountain Exp. Co., 96 M.C.C. 604 (1964); Chamber of Com., 91
M.C.C. 513 (1962).
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volume of business without fear of its dilution by competition. Only if
entry is controlled and its traffic is protected will this kind of carrier be
able to continue to supply a needed transportation service. This casts
an interesting sidelight on criticism sometimes heard regarding motor
carrier licensing requirements. It has been argued that regulation puts
too great a financial burden on the small carriers least able to bear it,
but the truth of the matter would seem to be that it is the small oper-
ator who gains most from entry controls. The big motor carrier can
afford to lose an account or two; for the small carrier such a loss might
well mean the end.
When federal motor carrier regulation was still in the planning
stages, it seemed to some that it would not be necessary to enforce
entry controls very strictly because the relatively small investment in
equipment involved-all comparisons then were with railroads-ren-
dered motor operations of little economic significance and meant that
a new service could be tried on an experimental basis with little risk.
This is no longer the case. Motor carrier equipment has become exceed-
ingly expensive, particularly for the specialized carrier. The general
freight carrier has found that it must perform more efficiently and
offer faster and better service in order to remain competitive, and the
cost to it of a modern automated freight terminal is prodigious. In the
words of the Doyle report: "We cannot afford to permit unbridled
competition to depress earnings to the point that fresh capital is not
attracted to the industry on as favorable terms as to other industry
which depends on transportation for its existence."20 It would appear
that economic considerations require the continuation of some com-
prehensive system of entry control in the interstate motor-carrier field.
III. ExcEPTIONS TO CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Ten specified varieties of motor transportation are at present spe-
cifically excluded from the Commission's economic regulatory jurisdic-
tion." The most significant exceptions from the licensing requirements
are probably the transportation of unprocessed agricultural commodi-
ties, fish, and ordinary livestock,2 2 transportation performed by agri-
cultural cooperatives, 3 and transportation taking place within a single
municipality, contiguous municipalities, or a zone "adjacent to and
commercially a part" of any municipality.24 The Commission has fre-
quently been faced with decisions of the courts which have had the
20 Doyle report 35.
21 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (Supp. 1966).
22 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (6) (Supp. 1966).
23 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (5) (Supp. 1966).
24 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (8) (Supp. 1966).
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effect of broadening the areas embraced within the statutory exclusions,
particularly with respect to the definition of agricultural commodities25
and the legitimate transportation activities of agricultural coopera-
tives.26 It has consistently taken the position that these exceptions to
the regulatory scheme should be construed narrowly, largely because
of the vast volume of traffic which comes within their terms and thus
may be transported by motor carriers not subject to any certification
requirements or rate regulation.
2 7
On the other hand, the ICC has by no means pressed for a general
expansion of its regulatory jurisdiction on all fronts. The most recent
addition to the list of motor operations exempt from economic regula-
tion, the emergency transportation of wrecked or disabled motor vehi-
cles by towing, was added to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1963 with
the Commission's complete support. 28 Moreover, the first time it con-
sidered tow-truck operations after the enactment of this legislation,
the Commission extended its coverage to include the towing of a re-
placement vehicle to the scene of the wreck or disablement, in spite of
the absence of any language dealing with this situation.29 In fact in
recent years, the Commission has appeared more and more to be seek-
ing reasons for not subjecting to full economic regulation motor opera-
tions which are of minor economic significance in the total transporta-
tion picture. For example, it has found to be exempt the transportation
of trash and garbage, and of the debris resulting from excavation or
building demolition, on the ground that the Interstate Commerce Act
requires authority only for the transportation of "property," and mate-
rials being hauled off to be discarded are not "property" in the usually
accepted sense of the term.30 The same reasoning was applied to the
25 East Tea. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Exp., 351 U.S. 49 (1956);
Frozen Food Exp. v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1956), aff'd. mem. 355
U.S. 6 (1957).
26 Northwest Agricultural Co-op. Ass'n. v. ICC, 350 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
27 The Commission made it first formal request that the agricultural commodities
exemption be limited to transportation from point of production to primary market in
1955. 69 ICC Ann. Rep. 128 (1955). Request for amendment of the agricultural coopera-
tive exemption was first made in 1961. 75 ICC Ann. Rep. 184 (1961).
28 49 U.S.CA. § 303(b) (10) (Supp. 1966). Statement of ICC Chairman Abe Mc-
Gregor Goff, "Hearings on H.R. 2906 before Subcomm. on Transport and Aeronautics,
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce," 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1963).
29 Werner Common Carrier Application, 95 M.C.C. 387 (1964).
30 Joray Trucking Corp. Common Carrier Application, 99 M.C.C. 109 (1965);
Miller Common Carrier Application, No. MC-124133 (Sub-No. 2) (ICC, Sept. 21, 1962);
Win. Helzer & Sons Contract Carrier Application, No. MC-123571 (Sub-No. 1) (ICC,
Sept. 28, 1961).
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transportation of corpses, which have been found to be neither property
nor passengers, and hence beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.31
Another example of broadening the actual language of an exemption
is found in the treatment by the ICC of the schoolbus situation. Motor
vehicles "employed solely in transporting schoolchildren and teachers
to or from school" are subject to a statutory exemption.32 In order to
allow schoolbuses to be used for extended school-related trips, the
Commission in Keller Common Carrier Application 3 in effect con-
strued the term "school" as used in the Act as meaning any educational
experience. This was an eminently practical construction; any visitor
to Washington in the Spring must know that schoolbuses are almost
as plentiful as cherry blossoms. The uproar in the local school districts
and parent-teacher associations can easily be imagined, should the
ICC have tried to put a stop to the use of uncertificated schoolbuses
for the traditional class trip. As the Commission noted,
Not only is such a result not dictated by the statutory language, but
it would be contrary to the public interest and would create regu-
latory problems for the schools, the schoolbus operators, and this
Commission without really benefiting the certificated passenger
carriers.3 4
While some might quarrel with the first dozen words of the quoted lan-
guage, the Commission's finding was not only the most practical one,
it has also been stamped with approval by the Supreme Court.
A pair of decisions involving motor operations within a single State
demonstrate inclination on the Commission's part to find, in the close
cases, that it lacks jurisdiction. In Motor Transportation of Property
within a Single State,35 it was found that operation by a for-hire motor
carrier transporting property within one State, as part of a continuous
movement which included a prior movement in private carriage across
a State line, is beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. This decision is
based on a finding that the Commission is so limited that in determining
its jurisdiction over motor-carrier operations it can look only to trans-
31 Dennis Common Carrier Application, 63 M.C.C. 66 (1954). In reaching this con-
clusion, the Commission refused to follow an earlier decision reaching a contrary result.
Steffen Common Carrier Application, 34 M.C.C. 779 (1942).
32 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (1) (Supp. 1966).
33 94 M.C.C. 238 (1963), aff'd sub nom., National Bus Traffic Ass'n. v. United States,
No. 64-C-536 (ND. Ill. June 3, 1965), aff'd. mern. 382 U.S. 369 (1966).
34 Id. at 241. The quoted language, although employed in making a statutory inter-
pretation, is much like that found in decisions, some of which are described below, involv-
ing a finding of public convenience and necessity.
35 94 M.C.C. 541 (1964), aff'd. sub nom., Pensylvania R.R. v. United States, 242
F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd. mem. 382 U.S. 372 (1966).
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portation performed after a shipment is tendered to a for-hire carrier.
Perhaps more revealing is a decision reached about the same time in
Motor Transportation of Passengers Incidental to Air.3 There the
Commission found that a passenger travelling to or from an airport,
in bus or limousine service within a single State, either immediately
before or after an air movement to or from an out-of-State point, was
travelling in intrastate commerce. Moreover, the decision is placed on
"public-interest" as much as on technical legal grounds. After citing
a number of cases generally holding that passenger transportation
within one State is in intrastate commerce except when the passenger
is traveling on a through interstate ticket, the Commission went on
to say:
Furthermore, we find no overriding necessity, rooted in the public
interest, to claim the involved transportation as interstate com-
merce. We are already heavily burdened enough with regulatory re-
sponsibilities without casting about to extend our jurisdiction be-
yond that specially required by law.37
Beginning in 1963, the ICC has several times requested Congress
to enact legislation which would authorize it to exempt from regulation,
upon due notice and hearing, any phase of interstate motor transpor-
tation found to be of such "nature, character, or quantity" as not to
"impair effective regulation, be unjustly discriminatory, or be detri-
mental to commerce." 8 As examples of operations which might be
exempted if it had this power, the Commission has invariably listed
the transportation of trash and garbage, of homing pigeons, and of
passengers in local mass transit bus service.
As far as trash and garbage are concerned, the Commission had
found a way to exempt their transportation even before this legislation
was first proposed. 9 As for homing pigeons, they at one time consti-
tuted something of a regulatory nuisance with several applications for
authority to transport them coming before the Commission within the
space of a few years. Pigeon transportation almost invariably involves
pigeon racing, and hence the specialized handling by a qualified and
experienced pigeon trainer. It seems patently ridiculous to subject to
federal controls the transportation of a panel truck or station wagon
load of pigeons a few miles so that they can be released to fly home
36 95 M.C.C. 526 (1964), aff'd sub nor., National Bus Traffic Ass'n. v. United States,
249 F. Supp. 869 (NJ). Ill. 1965).
37 Id. at 537.
38 77 ICC Ann. Rep. 13 (1963). The recommendation was most recently renewed on
January 23, 1967, and a bill, H.R. 6536, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), has been introduced
to implement it.
39 Cases cited note 30 supra.
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in a pigeon race. Nevertheless, the Commission in 1951 could unearth
no excuse for avoiding this regulatory burden. It found pigeons not to
be "ordinary" livestock, and consequently that their transportation
was subject to the certificate requirements of the Interstate Commerce
Act.40 Ten years later, this finding was affirmed4 in spite of the fact
that one member of the Commission pointed to a way out in a con-
curring expression. He urged that pigeon transportation should be
treated as an adjunct to the carrier's primary business, which is actu-
ally pigeon training, and hence not subject to economic regulation.
Judging from the language quoted above from decisions dealing with
schoolbus operations and airline passengers, the majority of the Com-
mission might now be ready to agree.
To say that the Commission could, if it wished, find a way to avoid
regulating the transportation of pigeons and trash is not to say that
legislation of the type proposed would not be valuable. Many transpor-
tation services are of no general economic significance or are by their
own nature self-regulating. Transportation of commodities which are
exceedingly valuable or which require equipment which is extremely
expensive will be likely to attract the attention of so few carriers that
entry controls become fruitless. Currency and bullion which must be
.transported in armored car service, and liquefied gases which must
be moved at extreme low temperatures in tube trailers costing upwards
of 100,000 dollars42 might fall into this category.
At the other end of the scale, very inexpensive and plentiful com-
modities can be moved profitably for only relatively short distances;
the fact that a particular movement is in interstate commerce may
arise simply because of an accident of geography, not because trans-
portation of any great distance or economic significance is involved.
The transportation of sand, gravel, and inedible salt in dump trucks,
moving for distances up to 100 miles, might very well be exempted
from any certification requirements. So too might the transportation
of any "unique chattel." For example, race horses and show animals
are too valuable and require too much care in handling for an
owner to be willing to entrust them to an unknown common carrier.
Hence when their transportation is involved the generally applied axiom
that existing carriers should have the opportunity to provide needed
service before new services are authorized cannot be applied strictly in
fairness to the owners of the animals, and any attempt to control com-
petition is likely to be ineffective as well as unnecessary.
40 Prang Extension, 53 M.C.C. 223 (1951).
41 Island Pigeon Training Ass'n., 86 M.C.C. 39 (1961).
42 Younger Bros., 95 M.C.C. 1, 9 (1964). Liquid hydrogen trailers are described as
osting between $550ooo and 10,000.
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Local mass transit operations are often so deeply rooted in the
immediate municipal situation that it is difficult for the ICC to make
as fully informed a decision concerning the need for new services and
their effect upon existing ones as could a local regulatory body. But this
is an area in which the public interest clearly demands some form of
entry control, and regulation from a distance is no doubt better than
none at all. Abdication of jurisdiction by the Commission should there-
fore be contingent upon the creation of some local body empowered
to assume responsibility. This has been accomplished in the Washing-
ton, D.C. metropolitan area, which encompasses portions of Maryland
and Virginia, by an interstate compact which expressly transfers cer-
tain jurisdiction from the ICC to a local agency.4 3
IV. THE FLEXIBLE CONCEPT OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
The Interstate Commerce Act offers nothing in the way of specific
guidance to the ICC with respect to what transportation services are
required by the public convenience and necessity. The act states simply
that motor common carrier service shall be authorized upon the filing
of an appropriate application to the extent that it "is or will be required
by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise
such application shall be denied."'44 As a consequence, it has been left
to the Commission and the courts to formulate general standards
against which individual proposals can be tested to determine whether
new operating authority should be granted.45 Almost without exception,
the development of such standards has been on a case-by-case basis, and
the cases that have been the vehicles for this development have been
43 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Regulation Compact, 40 U.S.C. 651
(1960).
44 49 U.S.C. § 307 (1964).
45 In the author's opinion this is a good thing. Where Congress has attempted to
provide a list of items to be considered in deciding a particular type of case, the results
have not been overly successful. The statutory criteria which must be applied in deter-
mining contract carrier applications are a case in point. 49 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1964). How
to apply and properly balance them has caused the Commission a great deal of trouble
and generated otherwise unnecessary litigation without really affecting the results in
individual proceedings. The debate over how to balance the criteria reached its height in
H. Messick, Inc., 92 M.C.C. 293 (1963), in which the dissenting Commissioners accused
the majority of trying to give equal weight to all the standards and failing to recognize
that one may be more important than the others in a given situation. Drawing an analogy
from prizefighting, the dissent compared the majority's approach to the "rounds" system
of scoring and expressed the view that it would be better practice to use the "total
points" system instead. Id. at 304. In practice, the application of the contract carrier
criteria has done little besides greatly increasing the length of the Commission's reports,
for it is thought necessary to make it clear to a reviewing court that each of the standards
has been considered and weighed against the other.
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application proceedings of the quasi-judicial, adversary type rather
than general rulemaking proceedings.
From the beginnings of motor carrier regulation the ICC has pro-
fessed to follow certain stated standards in granting or denying motor
carrier applications. One of the earliest attempts to articulate the con-
cept of public convenience and necessity appears in Pan American
Bus Lines Operation:
The question, in substance, is whether the new operation will
serve a useful purpose, responsive to a public demand or need;
whether this purpose can and will be served as well by existing lines
or carriers; and whether it can be served by applicant with the new
operation or service proposed without endangering or impairing the
operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest.40
This statement has been accepted as fundamental gospel and paid lip
service in countless Commission decisions.4 7 However, it does not tell
us how the ICC is going to decide a given case: whether it will find
that the new operation will or will not serve a useful public purpose,
that existing services can or cannot meet the public's need for transpor-
tation, or that the new proposal would or would not endanger the
operations of competing carriers.
A somewhat more useful declaration, and one equally often re-
peated in convenience and necessity cases, tells us that it is "funda-
mental that existing carriers should be afforded an opportunity to
transport all traffic which they can handle adequately, efficiently, and
economically. '48 As this statement implies, the applicant has the formal
burden of establishing the need for the service he proposes, and it is
generally true that he must demonstrate that any opposing carriers
authorized and willing to handle the traffic involved have been given
the opportunity to do so and found wanting in some respect. But any
general rule which concludes with three adverbs--"adequately, effi-
ciently, and economically"--is apt to prove too flexible a guideline
to be very helpful to parties and counsel trying to map legal strategy,
or even to the Commission itself in determining the merits of a given
application. What constitutes "adequate" existing service is often the
most important and most difficult question requiring an answer, and
the answer given is often one upon which not everyone would agree.
In fact, it is not uncommon for attorneys having extensive ICC
practices to complain that the standards used in determining public
convenience and necessity can be too easily bent to meet the proclivities
46 1 M.C.C. 190, 203 (1936).
47 See, e.g., American Buslines, Inc., 99 M.C.C. 506, 511 (1965).
48 Curtis, Inc., 92 M.C.C. 25, 31 (1961).
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of an individual decision maker. Commission members will be de-
scribed as "tough" or "liberal," according to whether they are thought
to be inclined to grant or deny applications. It is obvious that any gen-
eral concept is going to mean different things to different people, and
the lawyers' complaint may be justified to a degree. Over the past ten
years there have been rather substantial variations in the proportion
of motor carrier applications granted or denied. In the year ending
June 30, 1957, 77 percent of the motor carrier applications disposed
of, other than those voluntarily withdrawn by the applicants, were
granted in full or in part.49 In 1958 the proportion was 78 percent,
and in 1959 it was 81 percent. In fiscal years 1960 and 1961, the
figure fell to 74 percent, which reflects the general impression among
members of the Commission's bar that Division One, the ICC's motor
carrier division," as constituted in calendar years 1959 and 1960, was
exceptionally "tough." In fiscal year 1962 the proportion of total or
partial grants rose to 81 percent; it was 79 percent in 1963; 81 percent
again in 1964; 83 percent in 1965; and 85 percent in 1966.
The present trend is clearly toward more grants. This may in part
reflect the propensities of individual commissioners, but it seems more
likely that it stems from the prevailing economic conditions. When
business is generally good, available traffic increases and the autho-
rized carriers, prosperous and utilizing their facilities to near capacity,
are disinclined to oppose the applications of prospective competitors.
And it is almost axiomatic that unopposed applications will be granted."
This is likely to be disturbing to anyone looking for certainty in the
standards of proof required for a grant of a certificate. Actually, how-
ever, the situation is similar to that presented by an uncontested law
suit; just as a plaintiff receives judgment by default, a carrier can
expect a grant of his application upon a minimum of proof where there
is no opposition. Perhaps the best approach to the question of what is
public convenience and necessity is to consider first the elements that
are necessary to make a prima-facie case, and then to consider what
the result is likely to be if the application is opposed.
49 This figure, and those that follow in this paragraph, are based on data contained
in the ICC's annual reports. They are for fiscal years ending June 30 of the year named.
5o The Commission is divided into three divisions of three Commissioners each, in
which decision making authority is vested. Division One deals with operating rights,
Division Two with rates and related practices, and Division Three with finance proceed-
ings. Relating decided case data to division membership is complicated by the fact that
division assignments are made on a calendar year basis while most records are kept on a
fiscal year basis.
U In January 1967, for example, the employee board which decides most uncon-
tested motor carrier cases granted 194 applications and denied only four.
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In Novak Common Carrier Application,2 the Commission recently
had occasion to consider a straightforward application for authority
to transport lumber and related products from two Michigan points
to seven Midwestern States. Although the application was for a con-
tract carrier permit, the evidence needed to sustain the applicant's ini-
tial burden of proof is very similar to that required in a common car-
rier application. Novak's application was denied because of the appli-
cant's failure to make even a prima-facie case. His evidence was so
vague and unsatisfactory, it was noted, that it was impossible to ascer-
tain the supporting shipper's actual transportation requirements, if any,
so a grant of authority which would meet its needs could not be framed.
As an appendix to this report there was reprinted a notice which accom-
panies orders assigning application cases for processing without oral
hearing and fixing filing dates for verified statements, containing in-
formation and suggestions as to the minimum legal requirements of
an applicant's case. The notice provides:
Those supporting the application should state with specificity
the transportation service which they believe to be required.
The shippers and consignees supporting applications for au-
thority to transport property should identify clearly the commodities
they ship or receive, the points to or from which their traffic moves,
the volume of freight they would tender to applicant, the transporta-
tion services now used for moving their traffic, and any deficiencies
in existing services.
Those supporting an application for authority to transport pas-
sengers should indicate the frequency with which they would use
the proposed service and should identify any transportation services
now available and the inadequacies believed to exist in such
services.53
An applicant who tells the Commission (1) what is to be shipped,
(2) where the shipments are to move, and (3) how much traffic will be
available has made a prima-facie case, and if it does not appear that
there are other carriers interested in the traffic, the public convenience
and necessity will be found to require his service and authority will be
granted.54 Where there is opposition to his proposal, he would usually
be well advised to go one step further and try to develop reasons why
his opponent's service is inadequate.
It is where competing claims must be dealt with that it becomes
52 103 M.C.C. 555 (1967).
53 Id. at 558.
54 See also Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 307 (1964). An applicant must also
establish that he is fit which means that he must show that he has facilities and finances




difficult to determine the precise factors which control the decision to
grant or deny. A number of elements add to this difficulty. Almost
every application case stands or falls on its own facts, and a surprising
variety of factual situations are presented. It is possible to identify
some recurring situations and to predict that a grant or denial will
result," but the vast majority of application proceedings cannot be
easily categorized. Moreover, any attempt to develop data in this
area is complicated by the relatively few motor carrier decisions that
the ICC publishes in its permanent series of reports. In selecting deci-
sions for printing within its budgetary limitations, the Commission
must give preference to those of some clear precedential value. Con-
sequently, the usual convenience and necessity case, depending wholly
on its own facts and containing no novel points of law, is most unlikely
to appear in printed form, and for all practical purposes it remains in-
accessible to all but the parties0 6
In adjudicating a contested application the basic question, obvi-
ously, is whether a new service competitive with existing services should
be authorized.0 7 It has been said on many occasions that the inadequacy
of existing services is a basic ingredient in the determination of public
convenience and necessity.0 s Not too many years ago it could have been
maintained with some success that the Commission considered this
5 For example, a grant can be predicted where a motor carrier application has only
rail opposition and the supporting shipper has customers having no facilities to receive rail
shipments; or where the shipper must have farm or job site deliveries and the opposition
is limited to motor carriers operating only over designated highways. See Hutchinson &
Chandler, "Evidence in Motor Carrier Application Cases," 11 Vand. L. Rev. 1053 (1958).
56 The author is chairman of an employee board that predominantly decides con-
tested motor carrier applications. During a two year period ending in March 1967, this
board disposed a 765 proceedings but printed only 14 of its reports. In addition, between
25 and 30 percent of the application cases referred to a hearing officer for an initial
decision become final because no exceptions are filed to his recommended order. The
Commission has not printed such decisions since 1940.
57 Only situations in which there is a real conflict of interest are being considered
here. Many nominally contested cases can be compromised because the applicant has
asked for more authority than its public support will justify, and the opposing carrier's
operations, although they overlap the actual application, do not conflict with a grant of
authority which will meet the applicant's real purpose in filing the application. The
procedural modifications adopted by the Commission in recent years, and discussed in
the next section, were motivated to a substantial extent by the desire to lead the parties
to settle cases of this kind without the expense of an oral hearing.
58 See, e.g., Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. United States, 82 F Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); Inland Motor Freight v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wash. 1945). A
particularly full discussion of the requirement that the ICC give full consideration to
the effect of a grant on other carriers, and the extent to which it must make specific find-
ings to this effect, will be found in Southern Kansas Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 134 F. Supp. 502, 506-509 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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the pre-eminent ingredient. This protectivist regulatory philosophy
reached its high watermark in a 1959 decision59 which unsuccessfully
attempted to apply new legislation concerning motor contract carrierse °
in such a way as to protect from new competition existing carriers who
had never enjoyed the particular traffic involved. In language which
was broad enough to describe its thinking with respect to both com-
mon and contract carriers, the Commission stated: "There is, in
effect, a presumption that the services of existing carriers will be
adversely affected by a loss of 'potential' traffic, even if they may not
have handled it before."'" Two years later the Supreme Court reversed
that decision. Since then there has been a tendency to afford more
weight to the desires of the public witnesses, and to any unique ele-
ments which may be present in the applicant's proposed service that
are not provided by protestants; consequently, the proportion of
applications granted has been on the rise.
In the past two or three years the ICC granted a number of ap-
plications in the face of opposing carriers who had offered services
which had not been shown to be unsatisfactory in the sense that they
had provided demonstrably poor service or lacked essential facilities
to meet the needs of the shipping public. An application was granted
on the ground that the protestant had showed no past interest in the
traffic,"2 and another on the basis that the shipper should not be de-
prived of the "fruits of technological advance" manifested by the ap-
plicant's modern equipment.6 3 An applicant was granted a certificate
because the commodities which he had transported for many years for
a particular industry had gradually evolved into products not included
in his existing authority.64 Authority has been granted for the reason
that the protestant, who was participating with the applicant in an
admittedly satisfactory connecting line service, had contributed nothing
to the establishment of that service, or to the development and solicita-
tion of the traffic.65 It has also been granted on the ground that the sup-
porting shipper was unwilling to tender traffic to the opposing carrier
because the latter had an affiliate which was the shipper's business
competitor to which, it feared, the protestant might disclose the identity
of its customers.66
59 J-T Transport Co., 79 M.C.C. 695 (1959), rev'd., 185 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Mo.
1960), aff'd., 368 U.S. 81 (1961).
60 Statute cited note 4 supra.
61 79 M.C.C. at 705.
62 Dick Jones Trucking, 100 M.C.C. 46 (1965).
63 Dierckbrader Exp., Inc., 103 M.C.C. 540, 543 (1967).
64 Pennsylvania-Ohio Exp., Inc., 96 M.C.C. 449 (1964).
65 Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 96 M.C.C. 233 (1964).
66 American Courier Corp., 103 M.C.C. 298 (1966).
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Actually, even before the decision in J-T Transport the courts had
been leading the way toward a more equal balancing of the advantages
of a proposed service against its effects upon existing carriers. The point
is well stated in Hudson Transit Lines, Incorporated v. United States.
After noting that the inadequacy of existing facilities is basic to a
determination of convenience and necessity, the court went on to state:
This does not mean that the holder of a certificate is entitled to im-
munity from competition under any and all circumstances .... The
introduction of a competitive service may be in the public interest
where it will secure the benefits of an improved service without be-
ing unduly prejudicial to the existing service.67
Again, in Shaffer Transportation Company v. United States,6 8 the Su-
preme Court overturned an ICC decision denying motor carrier author-
ity on the basis of existing rail service alone, finding that the Commission
had failed to give sufficient weight to certain inherent advantages which
the more flexible, faster, and less expensive motor service possessed
when compared to that which the railroads could provide. 9
Thus the ICC, led by the courts, has come more and more to think
of convenience and necessity as involving something more than sub-
tracting existing service from proposed service and inserting the re-
mainder into a certificate. It has come to recognize that proposed
operations, existing operations, technological improvements, shippers'
needs, and changing commercial conditions all must be looked at as
interrelated parts of a whole picture, and that all the ramifications of
granting or denying a request for new authority must be considered.
V. PROCESSING APPLICATION PROCEEDINGS
For the first twenty years of federal motor carrier regulation the
annual level of applications filed held relatively steady, averaging be-
tween 2,500 and 3,000.70 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, the
number began to rise with 3,474 filings, and except for a recession in
1961 it has risen steadily ever since. The number exceeded 4,000 in
1960 and 1962; 5,268 new applications were filed in 1964; and in 1965,
which seems to have been a typical year with no discernible reason for
an inflated figure, the number was 6,353. In 1966 there were 8,681 new
applications, but this may be explainable in part by many applicants
67 82 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
68 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
69 Accord, Vincent Montone Trans., Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 484 (M.D.
Pa. 1964).
70 The data in this and the following paragraphs are taken from the ICC's annual
reports and from releases of the Commission's Public Information Office. The latter are
so ephemeral it seems futile to attempt to provide detailed references.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
rushing to meet two deadlines: a new application form, placing a greater
burden of disclosure upon the applicant, was adopted effective May 20,
1966; and a schedule of filing fees was adopted for the first time, effec-
tive July 22, 1966.
While the caseload was increasing during this period the ICC's
staff remained about the same size, increasing only 1.4 percent between
1960 and 1966. Nevertheless, the Commission was able to reduce the
average time required to dispose of a formal proceeding from 8.6 to 7.2
months. How the increasing motor carrier docket is being handled pro-
vides a study in what an administrative agency must do if it is to keep
abreast of its responsibilities.
The first step which the Commission took to meet its growing case-
load was to increase the delegation of decision-making authority to
employee boards. The Interstate Commerce Act already allowed the
assignment of informal proceedings and uncontested formal cases to
three member boards, and in 1961 the act was amended at the Com-
mission's request to permit such boards to decide contested cases as
well.7 Three Review Boards, one each to deal with rate, finance, and
operating rights cases, were established pursuant to this legislation. In
1964 two additional Operating Rights Review Boards were created, and
three years later each of them was deciding up to forty contested cases
a month. They were established primarily to determine cases which
have been the subject of a hearing officer's report and recommended
order to which exceptions have been filed-hence the name review
boards. A petition for reconsideration of a board's decision lies to a
division of three Commissioners. The measure of the boards' success
may be seen in the fact that only about 5 percent of their decisions are
successfully appealed.
Before 1964 the great majority of motor carrier applications were
routinely assigned for oral hearing unless the parties agreed to the sub-
mission of evidence in the form of written statements. The procedure
followed at that time, upon the receipt of the application itself, was to
fit the case into a hearing itinerary and then to publish a notice of the
scope of the application and of the time and place of hearing in the
Federal Register as public notice to all interested parties. Anyone
notifying the applicant ten days prior to the hearing of his intention to
appear and protest the application could do so. The result was that a
great many applications presenting simple and straightforward situa-
tions, applications with no opposition, and applications in which the
opposition could be eliminated by amendment, were being orally heard.
71 49 U.S.C. §§ 17(2), (5) (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1965) ; subsection (5) was
amended in 75 Stat. 517 (1961).
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While this wasteful procedure could be followed with some success in
the leisurely days when 3,000 applications were being filed annually,
some alternative had to be found when it became apparent that the
figure was about to reach 4,500 and was still going up. The ICC there-
fore modified its rules of practice to provide for immediate publication
of all its applications in the Federal Register and to require the filing
within thirty days of a formal protest, stating the ground therefore, by
anyone wishing to oppose. All unopposed cases were assigned for
handling under the modified procedure, so the evidence had to be sub-
mitted in the form of affidavits, and were assigned to an employee board.
During the whole of calendar year 1963, 414 unopposed applications
were processed under the modified procedure. In March of 1964 alone,
104 such cases were handled, and in December 1966 the number reached
a high of 307.
As the docket continued to rise the need for further steps was clear.
One of the biggest problems facing the Commission was the waste of
hearing time. Too many applications were being set for hearing and
then withdrawn at the applicant's request; perhaps this was because
of a schedule conflict by the applicant's counsel or, it was often
suspected, because anticipated support failed to materialize or because
the application had been filed as a "trial balloon" and not with any
serious intention of prosecuting it. Also, in a great many cases the party
filing a protest failed to appear at the hearing or, upon arrival, promptly
withdrew upon amendment by the applicant, leaving the application
unopposed.
An obvious way to discourage the filing of frivolous applications is
to charge a fee for each filing. The Commission had never imposed filing
fees, but a proceeding looking toward this result was instituted in
October 1965 and culminated in the establishment of a fee schedule as
of July 22, 1966. 72 The charge for filing a motor carrier application was
set at two hundred dollars, the highest level charged by the schedule.
The Commission also adopted a new application form which was
put into use on May 20, 1966. 73 For the first time applicants for motor
carrier authority were required to submit with their applications affi-
davits of supporting witnesses stating their intention to appear at an
oral hearing, if one were held, to give testimony on the applicant's
behalf. The Commission's Rules of Practice were modified to place upon
opposing parties a greater burden of making known the precise extent
of their interest in the applicant's proposal. 74 At the same time the ICC
72 Regulations Governing Fees for Services, 326 I.C.C. 573 (1966).
73 ICC Form OP-CR-9, 49 C.F.R. § 7.78 (1963).
74 49 C.F.R. § 1.247(d) (3) (Supp. 1966).
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published in the Federal Register a "General Policy Statement Concern-
ing Motor Carrier Licensing Procedures" which outlined the problem
it faced in the growing size of the docket and described the procedures
intended to meet that problem. The ICC announced that it intended to
greatly increase the use of no-oral hearing procedures in handling con-
tested motor carrier applications, that the initial decisions in such cases
would be made by one of the Operating Rights Review Boards, bypass-
ing the hearing officer's report and recommended order, and that the
boards would make all rulings on procedural motions after the proceed-
ings were submitted for decision, including the determination whether
oral hearing should be scheduled for purposes of cross-examining op-
posing witnesses. The first modified procedure cases handled under
this plan reached the review boards in August 1966, and by January
1967 thirty to forty a month were being decided.
Not only does the increased use of the modified procedure point to
a way for the ICC to control its docket, but it can produce substantial
economic and other benefits for the parties as well. Many motor carrier
application cases do not involve traffic which will be particularly valu-
able to a successful applicant.76 A simple procedure, without the time
consuming and expensive trappings of a full scale adversary-type hear-
ing, is obviously necessary to meet the needs of the small businessman
who finds it necessary to obtain a government franchise. It may fairly
be said, therefore, that the exigencies of time and budget have forced
the ICC to move away from the over-judicialized procedures upon
which it formerly relied and to develop new case-handling methods
better suited to meet the needs of the public and better geared to
effectuate the proper ends of the administrative process.
The Commission's tendency in recent years to modernize its tradi-
tional procedures can be seen in its increasing use of quasi-legislative
techniques to meet problems in specific areas. The Commission has not
been inclined to turn to general rulemaking proceedings in the licensing
area even where it has been necessary to interpret certificates or statu-
tory provisions. The more usual course has been to select some repre-
sentative application proceeding, formal complaint, or investigation into
the activities of an individual carrier as a vehicle to make interpreta-
tions which would in all probability have a significant future effect upon
the transportation industry as a whole. The dangers inherent in this
procedure are illustrated in the Commission's interpretation of the
schoolbus exemption discussed earlier.7 Because of the far reaching
75 31 Fed. Reg. 6600 (1966).
76 See the homing pigeon applications in text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
77 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
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effects which the decision would have, at one stage the case had to be
remanded to the Commission from a three-judge court which was con-
cerned at the Commission's refusal to allow trade associations and other
spokesmen of the motor-bus industry an opportunity to express their
views.78 Again, in dealing with the incidental-to-air exemption in 196271
the Commission found itself faced with a situation in which Division 1
had issued a decision in an application case which reversed a long line
of precedent.8 0 In order to attain a higher degree of stability, the entire
Commission, rather than deal with the broader issues presented in dis-
posing of the application itself, instituted a rulemaking proceeding
which resulted in the adoption of regulations of general applicability."'
The tendency today seems to be to favor this method of making
decisions which will have future effect for all or a class of carriers. The
Commission recently declined to answer certain questions regarding
the meaning of authority held by many passenger carriers and brokers
of passenger transportation under which they may provide "all-
expense," "sightseeing" or "pleasure" tours in spite of the fact that it
had before it two proceedings in which these questions were squarely
presented and in which the buslines and tour brokers were well repre-
sented. 2 Instead it announced that it would institute rulemaking pro-
ceedings in which the issues of general importance to the industry would
be considered. 3
Another indication of the Commission's move to a greater exercise
of its quasi-legislative powers in dealing with its licensing functions is
found in a number of special procedures that have been devised to deal
with specific problem areas which have arisen. The first manifestation
of this attitude is found in what appears to have been a highly successful
attempt to deal with the extensive changes in distribution methods and
patterns brought about by the introduction of multi-level rail cars for
the transportation of automobiles. Vast quantities of traffic were
diverted from motor carriers specializing in automobile transportation
during the early 1960's, resulting in severe economic hardship to them.
The changing traffic patterns made it clear that what had formerly been
78 National Bus Traffic Ass'n. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. I1. 1962).
79 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (b) (7a) (Supp. 1966).
80 Hatom Corp. Common Carrier Application, 88 M.C.C. 653 (1962).
81 91 M.C.C. 725 (1962); Motor Transportation of Passengers Incidental to Air,
95 M.C.C. 526 (1964); 49 C.F.R. § 210.45 (Supp. 1967).
82 Greyhound Corp., 100 M.C.C. 453 (1966) ; Michaud Bus Lines, Inc., 100 M.C.C.
432 (1966).
83 Passenger Transportation in Special Operations, No. MC-29 (Sub-No. 1) (ICC,
filed Jan. 17, 1966); Operations of Brokers of Passenger Transportation' No. MC-29
(Sub-No. 2) (ICC, filed Jan. 17, 1966).
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all-motor movements would in the future involve rail transportation for
a substantial portion of the distance, with the motor carriers' role shift-
ing to providing short-haul transporation from factory to railhead
or from rail terminal to dealer. This meant that the motor carriers
would need new operating authority if they were to keep any share
of their past business. In National AUtomobile Transporters Associa-
tion8: the ICC adopted a procedure under which carriers in this posi-
tion could obtain the authority they required to coordinate their opera-
tions with those of the railroads, and to continue to provide service at
the origins and destinations they had previously served. Instead of
requiring the carriers to produce supporting shipper testimony, the
Commission in effect provided a "grandfather" procedure, and made
the statutory finding of public convenience and necessity upon a show-
ing of past operations, loss of traffic to the railroads, and the pattern in
which coordinated rail-motor service had developed. The applications
filed pursuant to the special procedures were determined without oral
hearing. The Commission's authority to handle this situation in the way
it did has been upheld by the courts.8 5
Similar special procedures were adopted to facilitate the conver-
sion of irregular-route motor authority to regular-route authority when
a gradual shift in the character of a carrier's operations made it appear
that such a change was warranted.88 The Commission had long recog-
nized a distinction between regular and irregular route services,8 7 and
its experience had been that a number of applications were filed each
year for authority to convert from the latter type of operation to the
former. A procedure to provide for the issuance of regular route
authority in lieu of irregular route authority upon proof of past opera-
tions alone became effective on May 1, 1964, and over 150 applications
for conversion were filled prior to the cut-off date, March 1, 1965.
Recently the Commission had to determine whether authority was
required for the operations of motor carriers performing transportation
service for freight forwarders of household goods, when forwarding
itself was not subject to federal regulation. In Kingpak, Incorporated",
it was found that the underlying motor transportation was subject
84 91 M.C.C. 395 (1962).
85 Motor Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 250 (N-D. Ga. 1964), aff'd.
mnem. 381 U.S. 436 (1964); United Transports, Inc. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 561
(W.D. Okla. 1965).
86 49 C.F.R. S 2a (1963); Midwest Motor Exp., Inc., 96 M.C.C. 402 (1964).
87 Motor Common Carrier, of Property-Routes and Service, 88 M.C.C. 415 (1961);
Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 47 M.C.C. 23 (1947), aff'd., 80 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Iowa
1948).
88 103 M.C.C. 318 (1966).
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to the licensing requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act. This
meant that a large number of applications would be filed by carriers
seeking authority to continue operations they had believed to be ex-
empt. In the Kingpak decision the Commission announced that it would
entertain such applications under a special procedure, that proof of past
operations would be deemed sufficient to support a finding that the pub-
lic convenience and necessity required their continuance and that no
oral hearings would be held.
Kingpak represents the farthest step taken to date by the ICC in
adapting its procedures to the practical necessities of regulating motor
transportation. And for the first time there is found a clear expression
of the Commission's position that hearings are not required in applica-
tion proceedings." Four of the eleven Commission members would have
gone beyond simply making such a statement and would have disposed
of the anticipated applications without even giving competing carriers
the opportunity to protest and present evidence under no-oral hearing
procedures.
VI. CONCLUSION
It seems likely, at least for the forseeable future, that there will
continue to be economic regulation of interstate motor transportation,
and that control of entry will remain an important factor in the federal
regulatory scheme. As the national economy has grown, the amount of
freight and passenger traffic increased, and distribution patterns
changed, the ICC has taken steps to keep abreast of the situation. In
recent years it has apparently drawn away from an earlier mechanical
approach which often appeared to equate public convenience and neces-
sity with the absence of any existing transportation service, and to be-
come more willing to recognize the need of the public for modern and
efficient service. It has begun to replace its over-judicialized, formal
hearing procedures with others which are less expensive, more effective
and designed to meet the immediate needs of the carriers it regulates
and the public which must rely on common carrier transporation. Hope-
fully, these trends will continue, and the ICC, the oldest of the regula-
tory agencies, will continue to meet the challenges provided by an
industry on the move.
89 Id. at 343-44.
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